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Terri Wilson and Matthew Ryg offer a helpful reconstruction of a Deweyan con-
ception of autonomy, an endeavor that itself seems to partially embody the Deweyan 
spirit of inquiring into the usefulness of a concept and grounding it in real contexts 
before assessing its value. I appreciate the way they carefully bring together Dew-
eyan accounts of interest, self, and habit to offer a non-ideal account of autonomy, 
while being careful not to problematically read into or onto John Dewey a notion 
of autonomy when he himself uses the term so rarely. I say “partially” embody 
the Deweyan spirit because while this essay lays the groundwork of justifying an 
intriguing account of non-ideal autonomy, to fully embody a Deweyan approach, 
Wilson and Ryg need to pay much more attention to how this reconstructed concept 
might actually work within real contexts, especially in the midst of debates regarding 
educational policy and practice today — to determine whether it works, for whom, 
and in what circumstances. In this response, I will briefly add additional clarification 
to Wilson and Ryg’s helpful overview of self, interest, and habit, before addressing 
ways in which Dewey’s non-ideal view of autonomy might be helpful, and then close 
by expanding more on why this view of autonomy matters for educational practice 
and policy, especially in the context of school choice issues today.
As Wilson and Ryg rightfully note, many conversations about educational 
authority and choice today revolve around interests, specifically the interests of 
the state, the parents, and the child. Borrowing from Dewey, Wilson and Ryg also 
rightfully argue that the interests approach is problematic, for there is no ready-
made person who abstractly holds or invokes his interests regardless of situation or 
environment. Indeed, the self cannot be abstracted from the world in which it acts 
and transacts. So Wilson and Ryg point us toward a notion of autonomy that is a 
“critically reflective dimension of the self, but the self always remains constituted 
by specific habits, practices, and environments.” They locate autonomy within the 
self in ways that are necessarily connected to others, rather than as some type of 
solely distinct feature of a person. 
This is the point at which habit is perhaps the most useful notion they draw 
upon in their reconstruction. For Dewey, “All habits are demands for certain kinds 
of activity; and they constitute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word will 
they are will.”1 As I have argued elsewhere, 
There is no complete distinct person behind the habits who is completely divested from habits 
them and can choose which habit to enact and when. People do not use habits at will because 
they do not preexist them. “The use itself is the habit, and ‘we are the habit.’”2 
Habits are active and projective. They are not just acquired ways of being that we 
form through social transactions, but rather also entail the active, organizing force 
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of intelligent inquiry. It is habits that enable us to perceive and process the world 
around us, thereby preceding and shaping our ideas. 
With this additional insight into the Deweyan understanding of habit, we see that 
Dewey’s notion of autonomy points toward autonomy as what Wilson and Ryg dub a 
“quality of experience,” but one that is active — one that acts as a verb. Dewey sees 
bodies (or more accurately, body-minds) as verbs or gerunds — bodying. They are 
centers of activity. When autonomy is seen as a quality of experience of the engaged 
Deweyan body-mind, then autonomy is not some type of goal or end state that can 
be conveyed as a noun. Rather, it is an action, something that the body-mind does 
as it transacts with the world. As actions must always be situated, the reconstructed 
Deweyan account of autonomy is necessarily grounded in our real world experiences, 
which themselves are multiple and conflicting, rather than an abstracted ideal. This 
sense of autonomy better fits with the ways in which autonomy claims are often 
invoked in education practice and policy — as being torn between the interests of 
children, parents, and the state.
In terms of educational practice, the focus of teaching must then be on creating 
certain types of social environments that foster autonomy as an embodied habit, an 
activity guided by intellectual inquiry. Bad habits are those that become stagnant 
and routine, failing to keep up with the changing world around us or enable fruitful 
relationships between people. They prevent us from full reflection, intellectual inquiry, 
or the ability to envision and enact a different world for ourselves. If educational 
experiences do not foster the interplay of reflection and transaction directed toward 
growth, bad habits may thrive and autonomy may be at risk. Teachers, then, have 
a responsibility to prevent the stagnation of habit, to keep habit flexible and viable 
so that it carries students from one satisfactory experience to the next. Dewey ex-
plains, “We cannot change habit directly: that notion is magic. But we can change it 
indirectly by modifying conditions, by an intelligent selecting and weighting of the 
objects which engage attention and which influence the fulfillment of desires.”3 Good 
educational practice facilitates environments that immerse students in conflicting 
interests and ways of being, so that students must not only make decisions between 
them, but must act on them, in turn, shaping their lives.
In more ideal-driven philosophy, autonomy is a concept often linked with 
notions of freedom, where one’s measure of achieving freedom depends in part 
on the fulfillment of autonomy. For Dewey, freedom “depends on the continued 
development and growth of experience. Insofar as Dewey conceives of freedom as 
the ability to change oneself, to frame purposes in the world, and to enact environ-
mental change, flexible habits are central to achieving this goal.”4 It seems, then, that 
Dewey’s non-ideal autonomy may give us a new way to measure whether schools 
are sufficiently cultivating or enacting autonomy by looking at the extent to which 
it “works” within our real world endeavors to frame new purposes and to change 
oneself and the surrounding world — ends-in-view that guide our experiences. I 
admire Wilson and Ryg for asking, “to what extent does autonomy draw from the 
realities of lived experience? In what ways might it subsequently refine and guide 
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experience?” Notably, Dewey does offer criteria for “what works” that takes into 
account democratic norms, pursuit of freedom, impact on others, facilitation of 
growth, flourishing, and the meeting of our needs.
The implications of Dewey’s non-ideal autonomy are important in education 
policy matters, especially those related to authority, school choice, and the interests of 
parents. For example, school choice movements increasingly seem to shift attention 
to schools and choices that affirm particular religious or cultural beliefs of parents or 
a community. This shift warrants attention from philosophers of education as public 
schools or public funding sources and their mission of creating educated citizens 
must be balanced alongside private interests of parents and communities who want 
to pass on their particular views to their children.
School choice policy offers an intriguing testing ground for Dewey’s non-ide-
al autonomy. If a father removes his daughter from a public school that he finds 
objectionable and places her into a private school more aligned with his cultural, 
moral, or religious beliefs, the exit option of the private school poses an interesting 
situation for non-ideal autonomy. Because the girl (via her father) always has an exit 
option within a private school setting, the private school can even more forcefully 
or narrowly cling to its mission or worldview. So while the father may be enacting 
some form of freedom by placing his daughter into a school he prefers, the Deweyan 
non-ideal form of autonomy Wilson and Ryg describe may be jeopardized. 
Whereas established arguments using more idealized forms of autonomy5 would 
highlight that the child could not achieve this desired state unless presented multiple 
options of the good life and enabled to choose between them in some type of largely 
unencumbered way, the non-ideal form calls attention to the need for an educational 
setting that actively engages children within conflicting worldviews. It urges that 
children be immersed in multiple and competing communities so that they can learn 
to navigate for themselves as they frame purposes and act in the world around them. 
To do so, the alternative views espoused in those communities must be legitimately 
held and expressed by believers and should not be downplayed by the availability 
of an exit option. Finally, the quality of the school experience for cultivating auton-
omy depends, in part, on its ability to provide students a space where they not only 
select amongst alternative visions of the good life, but construct and pursue their 
own visions via guided intellectual inquiry. This measure of whether “it works” may 
lead to new thinking on determining whether private schools are valid alternatives 
to public schools or recipients of public funds via vouchers.
In closing, Wilson and Ryg have reconstructed a useful notion of non-ideal 
autonomy, one I hope that other philosophers and policy analysts will begin to test 
out in more detail within school practice and policy.
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